Citizenship, Higher Education, and Neo-Liberal Globalization

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Abstract
This paper assesses the critique of neo-liberal globalization and its effect on higher education, particularly liberal education’s mission of preparing citizens. While I find much of the critique valid, I identify fundamental flaws in the arguments of liberal educators and in their assumptions about both citizenship and education. I contend that these flaws stem from an incomplete understanding of liberal education and especially a tendency to demonize the economy. This tendency is traced back to the tradition of civic humanism. I conclude that the democratic task of liberal educators and the twenty-first-century university is to overcome this tendency by reconciling the economic and the political, homo economicus and the citizen.

The phenomenon of neo-liberal globalization and its effect on higher education, particularly liberal education’s mission of preparing citizens, has become the subject of intense debate. While defenders applaud the integration of universities into the global marketplace and their subjection to the logic of the market, critics believe this distorts the nature and purpose of post-secondary institutions and places the future of liberal education in jeopardy. I want to enter this debate by assessing the views of the critics and subjecting them to critique. This is despite the fact that I agree with most of what they say. In fact, it is because I agree that neo-liberal policies represent a grave threat to higher education in particular, and democratic societies in general, that I believe it is urgent that we critically examine neo-liberal globalization and its impact on universities. But it is equally urgent that we get this critique right. I do not think we have. Understanding why we have not requires an equally critical examination of the theory and practice of liberal educators and a questioning of their assumptions about both citizenship and education.

My intention, therefore, is to turn the criticism of neo-liberalism back upon the critics and ask why it is that, despite their belief in the efficacy of liberal education as a citizen-creating program, neo-liberalism — the exact opposite of the values which ethical citizenship and the program of liberal education represents — has still been able to triumph. If universities find themselves on the defensive with a paucity of allies to help them, must they not confront their failure to assume responsibility? If teaching citizenship in the ways they have done for decades has still brought them to this position, must we not look critically on the ways they have understood and organized their mission to prepare citizens? I want to suggest that the defenders of liberal education have failed in their mission and that we, the liberal educators, are therefore complicit in the success of neo-liberalism. I believe this failure stems from the fact that the university has insufficiently adapted to the reality of educating for citizenship in a mass democracy. In turn, I believe that this is the result of an inadequate or incomplete understanding of liberal education and some faulty assumptions upon which the critique of neo-liberal globalization rests. More specifically, I contend that it results from a demonisation of the economy and the economic. Furthermore, I intend to argue that one important source of
this demonisation, these faulty assumptions, and the inadequate understanding of liberal education can be found in civic humanism, the most influential intellectual tradition for understanding and discussing citizenship.

I will begin with a discussion of neo-liberal globalization and its impact on higher education, and then summarize the case against it before elaborating my critique of this case. Next, I will examine the concept of citizenship historically, briefly discuss the current-day experience and understanding of it, and, lastly, draw some conclusions about the tasks facing liberal education and the university if both they and democratic citizenship are to survive in any meaningful sense.

**Neo-liberal Globalization’s Impact on Higher Education: The Critique**

*Neo-liberalism* is not really ‘new’ at all. It is premised on the nineteenth-century liberal belief that unregulated markets, rather than the state or public institutions, will produce all of the social or public goods we need, from health care to education, housing to transportation, a thriving cultural life to a healthy environment. What is new is the period in which it has ‘triumphed’ and the conjunction of historical forces which surround it. The period is that of the crisis of the welfare state, a crisis which began in the mid-nineteen-seventies following three decades of unprecedented growth in both the economy and the socio-economic role of government. The historical forces principally include the information revolution, the emergence of a “knowledge economy,” and the phenomenon of globalization.

Definitions of globalization abound, but Peter Wagner’s is a useful starting point. He sees globalization as multi-dimensional. Economically, it involves the “creation of a world market.” Culturally, it has produced both greater homogeneity (some might call this “Americanization”) and greater diversity due to “increasing migration” and the mixing of cultures. Politically, Wagner and others believe that the transnational character of corporations, individual economic relationships, and information flows has weakened the sovereignty and power of the nation-state.¹

How has this affected post-secondary institutions? Not only has the state been less able to protect them from the pressures of the marketplace, but, under the influence of neo-liberal ideology, government policy has deliberately facilitated the “commercialization” of universities. Governments have increasingly seen universities as economic institutions serving economic goals, specifically, power and profits in the global, knowledge economy.² They have, therefore, required them to become more “accountable”; to be managed like businesses; to measure research and curricula in terms of their cost and commercial impact; to rely more heavily on larger classes and part-time faculty.³ Reduced public funding for universities has required them to become more dependent on corporate funding and commercial endeavours — many of these being international in
scope. One result of all this is intense competition among post-secondary institutions for both students and dollars.

These developments have put the proponents of liberal education on the defensive and made them intensely anxious about its status. For good reason. Despite repeated testimonials from corporate executives about the economic value of a liberal education and the abilities it cultivates, governments, university administrations, and members of the public have questioned the value and relevance of arts programs. In some universities, “certain departments in the humanities and social sciences have . . . disappeared.” But the defenders of the arts and liberal education think that more than their jobs are at stake. Their attacks on neo-liberal educational policies, therefore, focus on their widest political and social implications.

Perhaps the most influential, passionate, and incisive critique of neo-liberalism and its impact on education has come from the pen and voice of Henry Giroux. He defines neo-liberalism as a form of “hyper-capitalism” that has “undermin[ed] the social state” and “all things public.” The result is a world dominated by unregulated markets, where “inequality and private power shape the social order,” including our vocabulary for describing it. Because “the language of commercialism, privatization, and deregulation” has displaced “civic discourse,” we now confuse “market liberties” with “civic freedoms,” the choices of “consumers” with the decisions of “citizens.”

The impact on education, Giroux believes, has been disastrous. In a world where education cannot be viewed as a public good because nothing can, it becomes an instrument for augmenting corporate power and wealth. Hence, universities become “corporations selling products,” knowledge becomes a commodity, professors become “entrepreneurs,” university administrators become managers, students become “customers” and “consumers,” “industry-sponsored [and consequently skewed and not publicly-shared] research” becomes the norm, academic freedom and tenure are placed in jeopardy, and “those areas of study in the university [especially the humanities,] that don’t translate into substantial profits get either marginalized, underfunded or eliminated.” Ultimately, universities transform curricula into a means to secure employment; hence, training for the corporate workforce replaces education for citizenship.

I agree that neo-liberalism represents a most dangerous threat to higher education, public life, and democracy itself. I also agree that those wishing to introduce business practices and market forces to the world of higher education misunderstand the nature and purpose of universities. But I do not agree that the economy and universities are entirely antagonistic and that the latter should erect barricades to protect themselves from the former.
Demonizing the Economy: The Limitations of the Critique of Neo-Liberalism

Many of the critiques of neo-liberalism and the commercialization of education carry an air of nostalgia for some lost golden age when universities educated citizens, not employees. Critics make an assumption that we are losing or have already lost an education for democratic citizenship. But did we ever really have one that was not based on an extremely limited definition of citizenship? Until fairly recently, as Peter Jarvis points out, “being male, educated and owning property” were essential requirements for citizenship. He neglects to mention ethnic or racial requirements. In fact, for most of their history, universities have catered to an elite; the “citizens” they produced were generally white, male, and propertied. There was, until recently, little need to train them for employment or entrepreneurship. In turn, this need has meant that the more that higher education has become education for the masses, the less it has been about citizenship formation. Education for employment or entrepreneurship “generally focuses upon the transmission of knowledge.” It is generally elite private liberal arts colleges that focus on citizenship-building. Though much has changed in the past half century, the majority of citizens in Western democracies do not attend university. This is particularly true of Indigenous people, who were only recently deemed “citizens” in Canada, and for whom university is still an alien culture and forbidding place. A defence of liberal education that does not acknowledge the narrowness of access to it is necessarily inadequate, especially when it is meant to counter neo-liberal critiques of such education as elitist and irrelevant to the needs of contemporary society. Moreover, widening access to an institution that has not fundamentally changed its culture to accommodate and welcome diversity (of class, culture, ethnicity, learning styles, and culturally different epistemologies) is no more a democratizing process than colonialism (which promised access to the gift of ‘civilization’).

A second false assumption made by both neo-liberals and their critics is that a liberal education is incompatible with an applied one. Indeed, the most common criticism of the liberal arts curriculum is that it does not prepare students for the economy, that it cannot be applied to economic tasks. But the studia humanitatis (humanistic studies) — the foundation of our modern liberal arts curriculum — were developed in early quattrocento Florence to meet the economic and political needs of the Florentine elites. These rulers, bankers, and wealthy merchants needed citizens who were good speakers and writers, which is what the studia humanitatis were designed to produce. The humanities emerged in an urban context — in by far the most urbanized context in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Europe — because they were applicable to an urban and commercial world.

Hence, when contemporary defenders of the liberal arts reject the notion that education should be applied and, in contrast, privilege the citizenship-building purpose of this curriculum as fundamentally different and of greater value, they misrepresent the liberal arts. Furthermore, they allow their critics to define the terms of the debate, accept their definition of liberal education as non-applied, and cede, unnecessarily and unwisely, the economic ground to their opponents. Not only was liberal education originally applied,
there are many contemporary examples of the successful integration of applied or experiential learning into a liberal arts curriculum.\textsuperscript{12}

The applied origins and nature of a liberal education have been, for the most part, unrecognized by both neo-liberals and their critics.\textsuperscript{13} Hence the former can set up an opposition between higher education on the one side and the economy and its “needs” on the other. Critics of neo-liberalism and defenders of liberal education accept this opposition and claim that higher education should not be training workers for the economy, but molding citizens for public life and community service.\textsuperscript{14} Indeed, they suggest that any effort to align education with the economy taints the purpose of a purely liberal education.

Giroux, for example, insists that “education must not be confused with training.”\textsuperscript{15} But does it follow that education and training must be divorced? Must education be defined as necessarily impractical? Cannot training become education by being integrated into it? Cannot education become more effective and engaged with essential productive activities in our societies if students can both apply the lessons of theory to practice and the lessons of practice to theory? Is not maintaining the separation between trades training and academic education an elitist anachronism more suitable for aristocratic, rather than democratic, societies? Does it not rob us of an intellectually richer curriculum? Giroux condemns the proliferation “of more ‘practical’ degrees in technical writing and the like.”\textsuperscript{16} But would technical writing degrees proliferate if English departments integrated applied experience and communications into their curriculum? Moreover, would it hurt an English major to combine his/her degree with a minor in technical writing or a certificate in Teaching English as a Foreign Language? Would this not undermine the critics of liberal education who see it as utterly incapable of adapting to practical, economic realities?

Instead of integrating critical thinking with practical activity by bringing economic practice into a liberal arts curriculum defenders of the latter view the world of work and commerce as wholly threatening to the humanities and higher education. By demonizing the economy, liberal educators have erased all hints of the economic from their ideal images of citizens, students, and the university. First, in defining the student as a citizen-in-formation, they have blinded themselves to a fundamental reality of contemporary student life. Today’s students are to a great extent economic creatures. In North America, most are also employees or in business, and all, by necessity, are consumers.\textsuperscript{17} They are also future employees, entrepreneurs, and professionals. Pretending that education for citizenship is incompatible with education for work and assigning the latter function to community colleges and specialized institutions can only create an alienating educational experience for students who cannot recognize themselves in the university’s vision and mission statements and its daily practice. It also devalues — or, worse, renders invisible — the practical learning and experiential knowledge that working students have gained, instead of integrating it into the critical and scholarly learning they acquire in the university.
Second, in accepting a traditional image of the university, they have imagined it as divorced from the economy. Hence, their heightened anxiety in face of the fact that the growing need for private or self-generated funding means that universities are now becoming part of the economy much more explicitly than before. Since their inception, universities have always been a part of the economy, but they constructed an illusion that they were not.\textsuperscript{18} This was most obvious by their physical location: on hilltops and in green landscapes. Though they appeared to be bucolic islands in an industrial and now post-industrial sea, they patently were not.

In coming to an understanding of the role of higher education in today’s world, therefore, liberal educators need to confront two myths we have taught ourselves. One is that students are, within the university, entirely scholarly beings and not at all economic animals. The other is that universities are and should be divorced from the economy. These myths have contributed to what I call a demonization of the economy and the economic, which has led educators to not recognize the nature of students, universities, \textit{and citizens}, who have also been imagined as non-economic.

Imagining the citizen as non-economic was implicit in the belief that an applied education and one for citizenship-building are opposed. By accepting this neo-liberal contention, the defenders of liberal education have accepted the assumption that citizens and the economy are incompatible or, at any rate, that the world of citizens and the economic world are wholly separate realms. In contemporary society, it is odd to imagine a citizen who does not also, and have to, work. Moreover, the widening of access to higher education — a necessity in a mass democracy — means that more and more students must worry about their economic present and future.

This notion that citizens and the economy are worlds apart, that the economy is even a threat to citizenship, is not a new one. It is central to a long intellectual tradition that defined citizenship in non-, even anti-, economic terms. This tradition has bequeathed us a limited definition of citizenship, one that the critics of neo-liberalism have uncritically, perhaps unconsciously, accepted. This seriously weakens their critique of neo-liberalism and their defence of liberal education. It is essential, therefore, that we understand this tradition, its history and its hold on our imaginations, on our very capacity for thinking and speaking about citizenship.

\section*{Citizenship versus Commerce: The Civic Humanist Tradition}

We owe our dominant conception of citizenship in the modern western world to the political language of republicanism or “civic humanism.” Its roots can be traced back to the classical world and the Aristotelian and Athenian notion of \textit{zōon politikon}, the idea that people are naturally citizens and can only fulfill their human potential as such and, therefore, in self-governing city-states or republics. The tradition of civic humanism, a mode of discussing politics — particularly the political problems relating to a republican system of government — developed in quatrocento Florence and acquired its most influential articulation in the sixteenth century in Machiavelli’s analysis of republics, in
general, and the Florentine city-state, in particular. For Machiavelli and the civic humanists, the virtuous republican citizen always put the interests of the community, the universal good, before particular goods. If ever a citizen began to prefer private goods to the good of the whole community, the corruption of the republic’s integrity would inevitably ensue. This meant that the greatest threat to the autonomous citizen and the civic virtue or integrity of the republic was commerce. Commerce entailed the privatization of the citizen’s morals and actions, the prerequisite for corruption.\textsuperscript{19}

Two centuries later, civic humanism remained the most common language for discussing politics, but political thinkers faced a dilemma when they tried to adapt its concepts and vocabulary to the new commercial society of eighteenth-century England. This society placed before individuals an ever-increasing number of particular goods and encouraged them to put their private interests before those of the public. The problem now facing political theorists could be phrased thus: “How could the classical ideal of the citizen, an individual willing to risk his life for the survival of the polity, be reconciled with the modern \textit{bourgeois}, the private individual who is concerned above all else with the satisfaction of his own material needs?” As J. G. A. Pocock puts it, “the concept of the citizen was antithetical to that of economic man.”\textsuperscript{20}

Within the conceptual framework of the civic humanist tradition, this problem remained more or less insoluble. The increasing use of the concept of \textit{homo economicus} (economic man) — Adam Smith wrote of “a certain propensity in human nature. . . to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another” — as the first assumption of political and economic theory was a tacit admission of an inability to reconcile the ideal of citizenship with the exigencies of commercial or bourgeois society.\textsuperscript{21} Thus the use of such classical concepts as republican virtue and citizenship gradually declined, as the language of liberal theory and political economy ascended in importance across the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

But they did not disappear. They survived in the work of republican thinkers like Rousseau and were revived when first the American and then the Jacobin republics were created. They remained relevant to the century-long effort to create a stable, sustainable French republic, but they existed in a tense relationship with liberal theory.

For the German romantics and idealist philosophers, this tension was symptomatic of the divided nature of the modern world and the modern self. While liberals imagined the separation of “civil society” from the state as a necessary condition for personal liberty and economic freedom, the German intellectuals viewed the division between a public, political realm and a private, economic one as a ruptured world; individuals in such a world were equally ruptured, unable to integrate their political and economic selves.\textsuperscript{22} Both the Germans and Rousseau saw \textit{homo economicus} as an impoverished substitute for \textit{zoon politikon}. Indeed, for Rousseau, Hegel, and Marx, the citizen had become an impossibility in a commercial society, where political life had been reduced to \textit{a means} of guaranteeing the freedom and security of economic activity. While Hegel hoped the German state would overcome this problem and provide a higher realm in which the individual as citizen could be fully realized, Marx believed the state could not heal “the
division of man into the *public person* and the *private person.*” In the capitalist world, he contended, “political life declares itself to be only a means, whose end is the life of civil society”; “the citizen is declared to be the servant of egoistic ‘man’,” the private, economic individual. Furthermore, political philosophers privilege the “non-political” egoistic person, “man as a member of civil society,” as the “natural” or “authentic man.”23 What Marx wanted — as did German philosophers since the late eighteenth century — was a reconciliation of our economic and political selves. But so long as a division existed between civil society and the state, so long as humanity served the economy and not the other way round such a reconciliation, he believed, would remain impossible.

Hence, by the mid-nineteenth century, the classical concept of citizen appeared to some to be irreconcilable with the reality of life in a commercial or capitalist society. In authoritarian states like Germany, however, this was a rather abstract problem, as the opportunity to play the role of classical citizen did not exist for the vast majority. It became a real problem only with the emergence of the first mass democracy in Europe.

This was the Third Republic of France, born in 1870 in the wreckage of the Franco-Prussian War and Paris Commune.24 A republic required loyal citizens, but France was also a capitalist society that needed workers. Was it possible both to educate citizens and train workers for such a society? This question motivated much of the work of Emile Durkheim, who was one of first to make the question of the state’s role in educating citizens in a mass democracy a central preoccupation in his work.

For Durkheim, this question was of paramount importance because recurrent economic crises and intensifying conflicts between capital and labour in the late nineteenth century disproved the liberal notion that the economic exchanges among individuals held society together. Indeed, for this founding father of sociology, unregulated economic activity was the biggest threat to both citizenship and social order.25

At the same time, Durkheim believed that the classical notion of citizenship needed to be adapted to a new, very different republican society. Taking aim at Hegel (and probably anti-republican conservatives in France), he claimed that “the cult of the City State” was no longer relevant.26 Putting public before private interest may have seemed natural in a small *polis* where political participation by all the citizens was possible. In a highly centralized modern state, however, with a vast bureaucracy, great inequalities of wealth, and powerful interest groups, it was more difficult for individuals to prefer the interests of the state to their own.27

Durkheim had two principal solutions, and both required state action. The government needed to regulate the economy and create an educational system that would transform individuals, rendered economic egoists by the marketplace, into citizens.28 Hence, education should do more than train workers for the economy; in fact, it should de-commercialize the mentality of individuals and convince them that they were more than material beings with material needs. In one of his earliest published writings, Durkheim stated:
One must never lose sight of the goal of public education. It is not a matter of training workers for the factory or accountants for stores, but citizens for society. Education, therefore, should be essentially for moral improvement; it should detach minds from egoistic views and material interests.²⁹

Traditions die hard. Even in Durkheim’s reformulated understanding of citizenship, created for a mass democratic industrial nation, the citizen and commerce are incompatible.

Reconciling the Economic and the Political: The Democratic Task of Universities

Durkheim’s views on citizenship were relevant to a period of building and consolidating the nation-state. A century later, a new social reality exists, one where the concept of citizenship needs to be reconciled with the fact that the nation-state is no longer independent and sovereign in the traditional sense (though predictions of its demise may be exaggerated). Neo-liberals have been quicker than liberal educators to adapt this concept to a globalizing world. Hence, the language of both governments and educational institutions stresses the importance of portable skills and adaptability — presumably what individuals dependent on trans-national employers and supra-national markets need to ‘participate’ as ‘global citizens’ in a global marketplace.

Corporations are also commercializing and privatizing the concept of citizenship. They frequently refer to their employees as “corporate citizens” whose extra-individual commitments should be to the company, not society. In this model, one can lose citizenship by losing one’s job (and with global corporations, a job can be lost to a worker on the other side of the world), and one gets paid to be a citizen — an anathematic notion to the civic humanist. Not to the neo-liberal, who views private economic activity as the solution to all problems.

There are other ways in which citizenship is being privatized. In the USA, government and the media have increasingly, since at least the Reagan years, emphasized a private or intimate ethos of citizenship, one associated with the home, property, and the family.³⁰ This ethos has fuelled the desire for home ownership, while encouraging mortgage companies to exploit it. The result has been the impoverishment of families and the enrichment of corporations and banks whose unethical and greedy behaviour is consistent with a model of citizenship that equates it with self-interested economic activity in the private sphere. At the same time, and with no sense of irony, politicians and the media depict the public world not as a realm in which citizens may express and fulfill their human potential or build community, but as one of danger. The safety and security of the home and the family, pictured as under threat (from foreign “terrorists,” not domestic banks), are ultimately guaranteed by the state, and the citizen’s obligation to it is reduced to one of moral and practical vigilance.
With globalization, the privatization and commercialization of citizenship has been accompanied by the privatization and commercialization of knowledge. This has been facilitated enormously by the commercialization of universities. The sale of research, courses, curricula, and more, through online or distance education and corporate contracts has helped transform knowledge into a commodity that can be, in Leonardo Garnier’s words, “privately owned, bought, and sold.”

As Garnier recognizes, the challenge for society — which must be faced head on by universities — is to transform the knowledge economy into the knowledge society. But this requires a widespread understanding of and appreciation for public goods and public life. Such an understanding and appreciation have been the goal of liberal education, but the democratic obligation to make this widespread has not been taken seriously enough. We require growing numbers in society to value public goods if they are to see both public and private investment in higher education as a necessary social investment. This means that universities must engage with their communities in multiple and profound ways. And they must rise to meet a difficult challenge: if an institution (the university) which traditionally had a near monopoly on the creation and dissemination of knowledge must transform a knowledge economy characterized by inequality (access to knowledge through the Internet, for example, is very unequal and limited) into a knowledge society, a society where access to the creation and dissemination (or sharing) of knowledge is increasingly widened, then this institution must first transform itself.

This transformation must be an answer to the question: how can today’s universities fulfill their citizen-building obligations? It is no longer effective or ethically relevant merely to teach an unreformed republican model of citizenship to our population of students, a population trained — by the state, the media, advertising, and business — to define citizenship in private terms. But something more is required than merely adapting this republican model to the reality of mass democracy. The concept of citizenship needs to be made relevant, needs to be felt as vitally relevant.

How can this be done? I think this can be accomplished by asking our students and our communities perhaps the most pressing question we can ask them: what is democracy? The concept and practice of democracy — and not just citizenship — needs to be questioned. The former resonates more with the public than the latter, which is why the American administration and its allies justify the Iraq War as a means of protecting democracy (not citizenship) at home and spreading it abroad. In today’s world, one in which neo-liberalism silently threatens the very existence of democratic societies — an existence we take for granted — the university’s supreme role should be to problematize the concept and the reality of democracy. Universities should teach students and the public: (1) that defining democracy is not straightforward but a problem; (2) that its historical emergence was not inevitable or natural but the result of popular struggle; (3) that its continued existence is not inevitable, but a problem needing to be solved; (4) that the major public issues of our time impinge on the nature and survival of our democracy; (5) that being democratic, i.e., participating in democracy and sustaining it is not easy or unimportant, but problematic; (6) that the notion of human or civil rights is a construct,
but one of paramount importance. If universities do not do these things, then few will commit themselves to the defence of liberal or citizenship education.

Without public consensus on the value of citizenship and that it is the objective of higher education to develop such citizens, universities and colleges will not be able to fulfill the traditional goal of citizenship education. Without such consensus, governments will not respond to and support the desire for post-secondary systems structured to develop citizens. The countervailing pressure of the market will always be stronger. But, paradoxically, the one institution best placed to produce such consensus is the university itself, and it is increasingly at the mercy of government and corporate pressures to do otherwise. The task, therefore, of universities is to balance the need to generate non-public sources of revenue with the traditional mission of education for citizenship. This will require ingenuity, imagination, and innovation. It will require recognition that the triumph of neo-liberalism represents a failure of universities to educate students and society about the importance and relevance of both the concepts and reality of citizenship, democracy, and public life. To do this, they will need also to demonstrate their own relevance. Twenty-first-century universities, therefore, must engage their communities — both internal and external — in debates around the relationship between citizenship and education. They must engage corporate and business leaders in this discussion by demonstrating to them that they have a vested interest in its outcome. To do this, they must, on occasion, speak the language of commerce and ‘sell’ what they do in terms their audience can understand and appreciate. To do this, they must integrate into their curricula and critical study the realities, needs, and possibilities of the economic world. They must enable students and the public to connect their private desires, aspirations, anxieties, including their private economic desires, to public concerns and public discourse. Universities must be able to do what the Florentine humanists of the fifteenth century did: demonstrate, to both academics and employers, that educating citizens is not only compatible with but identical to educating employees and entrepreneurs. Universities should recognize that if evidence shows that the best employees and entrepreneurs are those equipped with the citizenship abilities and values of a liberal education, then the economy needs citizens. They must also recognize what their students — who pay a great deal for their education — already know: that citizens need the economy.

Universities will be able to bring citizens and the economy together when liberal educators stop being inverted reflections of neo-liberals. Both fetishize the economy, either as the solution to all of our needs or as the source of all problems. Both separate economics from politics, with neo-liberals privileging the former and liberal educators privileging the latter. This separation of politics from the economy, a separation (ironically) with roots in both civic humanism and liberalism, must be overcome if the twenty-first-century university is to demonstrate its relevance to the vast majority. In a sense, universities must complete the mission of Hegel and Marx: they must reconcile *homo economicus* and the citizen, the economic and political animal. The survival of themselves and of democratic polities depends on it.
Notes


2. The impact of globalization on government views of education is apparent in numerous policy statements and reports. In Canada, the Radwanski Report of 1987 stated: “Education . . . now has become the paramount ingredient for competitive success in the world economy” (quoted in Katharyne Mitchell, “Educating the National Citizen in Neoliberal Times: From the Multicultural Self to the Strategic Cosmopolitan,” 2003, 22, http://faculty.washington.edu/kmit/tibg%20current.doc). Similar statements can be found in American, British and European reports and white papers (see ibid. and Peter Jarvis, “Globalization, Citizenship and the Education of Adults in Contemporary European Society,” Compare 32, no.1, 2002: 14). The first minister of education in Tony Blair’s government made it clear that higher education is central to the knowledge economy: “I make no apology for placing higher education at the heart of the productive capacity of the knowledge driven economy.” The minister of trade and industry stated: “Knowledge and its profitable exploitation by business is the key to competitiveness.” (David Blunkett and Peter Mandelson, respectively, quoted in Mitchell, 29.) In a 1988 report, Geraldine Kenney-Wallace, Chair of the Science Council of Canada, wrote: “destiny includes closer university-industry interaction . . . It is imperative that the university’s knowledge be put to work for winning in a global economy.” (Quoted in James L. Turk, “Introduction — What Commercialization Means for Education,” in The Corporate Campus: Commercialization and the Dangers to Canada’s Colleges and Universities, ed. James Turk, Toronto: Lorimer, 2000, 3.)


9. “Status Indians” only received the vote in 1960.

10. See Rauna Kuokkanen’s call for “reshaping the university” by having it “recognize...indigenous epistemes as a gift.” (Reshaping the University: Responsibility, Indigenous Epistemes, and the Logic of the Gift, Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007, 21.)


12. My own institution, for instance, has an “Applied Studies in History” course in which students have practicum placements with local employers. The course begins and ends with in-class academic discussions of the methodological and ethical implications of applying history outside the classroom.

13. Exceptions include Axelrod, Values in Conflict, and Richard S. Ruch, who, in criticizing Mortimer Adler’s defence of a liberal arts education, writes “that, from the outset, an education in the liberal arts was a vocational education.” (“Lessons from the For-Profit Side,” in Globalization and Higher Education, 100.)


18. See Axelrod, Values in Conflict, 31, for the history of the university’s role in training individuals for the economy and the state.


24. Women, however, did not acquire the right to vote until the end of World War Two.

25. See in particular Émile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, trans. George Simpson (New York: Macmillan, 1933). This anti-economic theme runs throughout the text; it is part of, but also more than, a critique of liberalism.


27. Durkheim, Division of Labor in Society, esp. 28.


33. Access to the Internet varies greatly among countries, regions, classes, and communities. As of December 2007, North America had the highest rate of access
(71.1% of the population; Europe was second with 43.4%) and Africa the lowest (4.7%) — though the rate of growth in Internet users between 2000 and 2007 was second highest in Africa (882.7%). See www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm. Among communities, indigenous people have very limited access to the Internet and other technology. (A recent discussion can be found at www.abc.net/au/rn/lifematters/stories/2007/2016270.htm.)

32. As this is most likely for regional universities, they will become ever more important and relevant to the future of both universities and liberal education.

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